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ABSTRACT 
 This work examined effects of construal levels, or how abstractly one views one’s 
situation, on negotiated agreements. In contrast to prior work emphasizing the importance of 
taking an abstract view or high construal level, this dissertation demonstrates that both high and 
low (concrete) construal levels can be important, and that considering both is still more useful. 
Specifically, this work showed several new findings. First, results showed that adopting a low 
construal level can increase parties’ likelihood of creating value by unbundling issues under 
discussion. This is in contrast to prior work showing low construal levels were not effective for 
creating value by trading off issues, and work suggesting that low construal levels do not 
promote creative solutions. This work also showed suggestive evidence that adopting a high 
construal level might increase parties’ likelihood of creating value by adding new issues to the 
discussion. Finally, this project showed adopting both high and low construal levels for the same 
situation fostered creating value by both adding and unbundling issues. The larger insight from 
this dissertation is that, despite clear evidence that there are several ways to structure agreements 
to create value for all parties (trading off issues, unbundling issues, adding new issues, contract 
terms contingent on the outcomes of future events, and so forth), researchers seem only to make 
claims that factors improve or hinder parties’ likelihood of forming any and all kinds of value 
creating agreement. This work showed that different factors could improve or hinder parties’ 
likelihood of forming specific kinds of value creating agreements.  
 The studies in this project add to a growing body of work examining negotiations in 
which parties can redefine the issues under discussion and so form creative agreements. This 
dissertation extended the domain of creative agreements by noting that negotiators can generate 
creative solutions in different ways based on how abstractly they are thinking about the situation. 
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The findings that concrete understandings and adopting both abstract and concrete 
understandings can be effective have implications not only for negotiation but also for any kind 
of problem solving with an opportunity for creativity. For example, managers often have to 
communicate with different functional specialists, and adopting both high-level and low-level 
construals might foster effective communication and translation. 
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CHAPTER 1 
CREATIVE AGREEMENTS 
 
1.1. Introduction  
An important topic in negotiation research is the development of integrative agreements 
that reconcile both parties’ interests and lead to higher joint benefit (Follett, 1940; Pruitt, 1983a; 
Walton & McKersie, 1965). There are several ways of forming integrative agreements, but most 
research has used scorable games to study the formation of tradeoffs across known issues and 
emphasized the need to share information about issue priorities (Bazerman, Magliozzi, & Neale, 
1985; Froman & Cohen, 1970; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; Thompson, 1991; Thompson & Hastie, 
1990). There are many fewer studies examining integrative agreements apart from tradeoffs, 
particularly creative agreements or agreements resulting from changes to the issues under 
discussion (Loewenstein & Howell, 2010; Sinaceur, Maddux, Vasiljevic, Nückel, & Galinsky, 
2013). For example, parties might identify and add new issues (e.g., Kray, Galinsky, & 
Markman, 2009) or they might unbundle an existing issue (e.g., Butler, 1994). Prior work has 
made general arguments about integrative agreements as requiring creativity, problem solving, 
and a focus on interests. That is, prior work has assumed that the same factors lead parties to 
form any kind of integrative agreement, including all kinds of creative agreements. The purpose 
of the current research in this paper is to propose and test theory about whether different 
conditions lead to different types of creative agreements. 
The conditions I propose to examine are ways of thinking about negotiation situations. 
Specifically, I invoke construal level theory (Liberman & Trope, 1998) regarding the level of 
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abstraction people use to interpret situations to generate hypotheses concerning how different 
construal levels lead to different types of creative agreements in negotiations. I propose that a 
high-level construal is likely to encourage parties to consider the broad scope and background of 
the situation due to taking an abstract view, resulting in identifying new issues to add to the 
negotiation. In contrast, a low-level construal is likely to be beneficial for analyzing the details of 
the existing issues due to taking a concrete view, resulting in unbundling an existing issue in the 
negotiation. Furthermore, I propose that adopting both a high-level construal and a low-level 
construal is likely to encourage parties to take a broad range of information into account and so 
form agreements that both add new issues and unbundle an existing issue. I conducted tests of 
these proposals using two empirical studies that manipulated construal levels. 
The current research is the first to investigate different pathways to form different types 
of creative agreements. There is a small amount of research examining creative agreements 
(Butler, 1994; e.g., Butler, 1999; Kray, Galinsky, & Markman, 2009; Loewenstein & Howell, 
2010; Sinaceur et al., 2013). However, none of these studies examines both unbundling and 
adding simultaneously. All of this work treats all kinds of creative agreements as resulting from 
the same process. In examining whether there are different conditions that lead to different kinds 
of creative agreements, I am opening up new possibilities for research on integrative negotiation. 
In what follows, I first discuss the nature of creative agreements. I review research on 
creative agreements as well as discuss my own work on creative agreements. Next, I provide an 
analysis of the processes of unbundling an existing issue and adding new issues. Based on the 
differences between these two processes, I argue that negotiators’ construal levels could 
influence them to form different types of creative agreements. Also, I discuss how adopting both 
a high-level and a low-level construals might enable negotiators to form creative agreements that 
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both unbundle and add issues. Then, I describe two experiments that investigated the effects of 
construal level on types of creative agreements. Finally, I discuss the implications of the 
findings. 
1.2. Literature review on creative agreements 
Effective negotiation typically requires parties to form integrative agreements. Integrative 
agreements reconcile parties’ divergent interests and so generate joint gains (Follett, 1940; 
Froman & Cohen, 1970; Pruitt, 1981; Walton & McKersie, 1965). Previous negotiation research 
on integrative agreements predominantly focused on using the available issues to form mutually 
beneficial tradeoffs to capitalize on parties’ different preferences (Froman & Cohen, 1970), 
although there are other ways to increase joint profits such as changing the issues under 
discussion by generating creative options (Follett, 1940; Pruitt, 1981; Walton & McKersie, 
1965). Stated simply, most scholars have focused on discovering the cognitive and social 
conditions that best position negotiators to reach integrative agreements and presume that 
studying how parties make tradeoffs in scorable games provides findings that generalize to all 
kinds of integrative agreements. However, a growing body of work emphasizing creativity is 
raising interest in non-scorable games and the factors that lead to negotiators forming creative 
agreements (Anderson & Thompson, 2004; e.g., Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, & White, 2008; Kray 
et al., 2009; Loewenstein & Howell, 2010; Maddux, Mullen, & Galinsky, 2008; Sinaceur et al., 
2013).  
This new line of research has conceptual roots in earlier work. Decades ago, Follett 
(1940) posited that organizational conflicts could (and should) be negotiated through integrating 
the desires and interests (i.e., parties’ ultimate goals for engaging in negotiation) on both sides of 
the conflict. Follett emphasized that there is often the possibility of something better than the 
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apparent options and so encouraged parties to resolve conflicts constructively and creatively, 
such as fractionating issues into sub-issues or inventing novel settlement options.  
Walton and McKersie (1965) provided a more systematic model. They claimed that 
“integrative potential can be exploited only if it is first discovered, its nature explored, and it is 
then acted upon by the parties” (1965, p. 137). They considered the process of integrative 
agreements to be a joint problem-solving process, and that this process involves redefining the 
negotiation problem. Accordingly, they emphasized invention and creativity because these are 
essential to redefining issues to discover integrative potential. Capitalizing on further 
developments in negotiator psychology, Brett, Northcraft, and Pinkley (1999) provided a process 
model to explain changes in negotiators’ goals resulting from interactions with the other party. In 
their interlocking self-regulation model, when parties shift their attention to their interests, it 
increases the flexibility of their thinking, and so helps them discover new options and generate 
creative solutions. In addition, Carnevale (2006) illustrated how integrative agreements can take 
many forms and emphasized the role of creativity in forming integrative agreements, since doing 
so requires developing new understandings. He also noted that devising new alternatives is the 
most creative form of integrative agreement.  
The importance of creative agreements is also noted by scholars taking a discourse 
analysis approach to studying negotiation. Putnam and Holmer (1992) discuss “issue 
development,” or the modification of the issues under discussion in a negotiation. They argued 
that parties typically begin the negotiation with their own conceptualization of the problem, but 
then their initial perceptions change in the course of their interaction. In trying to persuade each 
other, they are shaping and reshaping the descriptions of the issues. In related work, Gray (2004) 
argued that parties frame and reframe the issues under discussion, and in so doing open up new 
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avenues for developing agreements. Specifically, using a case analysis of an environmental 
conflict, Gray (2004) showed that stakeholders’ frames and processes for promoting reframing 
were critical to joint problem solving and the generation of a successful new collaborative 
solution. In short, there are theoretical reasons and qualitative case analyses supporting the 
importance of creative agreements.  
Given their importance, a critical question is what leads parties to form creative 
agreements. Presumably a necessary condition for creative agreements is effective, coordinated 
communication, as parties need to focus on information about interests. To integrate the interests 
of both sides of a conflict and to engage in joint problem-solving, parties have to share 
information about interests and also listen to and appreciate what other parties are saying. They 
need to craft and discuss new options together that they did not come in thinking about and that 
might satisfy their interests in a new way that they did not consider before.  
Effective coordinated communication, and the sharing, listening, and appreciating of 
interests followed by jointly crafting new options with that information, are not easy tasks. For 
example, if one party shared relevant detailed information about an existing issue, it will not be a 
productive start if the other party is thinking about the broad purpose of the negotiation and so 
does not appreciate the value of the specific information. As a result, they would not be likely to 
discuss that information further and so would lose the opportunity to redefine issues and form a 
creative agreement. Consistent with this logic, Gray (2004) argued that failing to understand 
each other’s frames can disrupt parties’ effective coordinated communication.  
Effective coordinated communication also likely requires that parties are open to 
changing their initial frame. For instance, Kray and her colleagues (2009) studied openness 
generated through different types of counterfactuals. They showed that encouragement to 
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consider additive counterfactuals (if only I had), which fosters an openness to new information, 
led to higher rates of forming creative agreements than considering subtractive counterfactuals 
(if only I had not), which limits attention to new information. As a second example, the total time 
spent abroad, an indicator of time spent learning to redefine one’s initial interpretations of 
situations, is also predictive of forming creative agreements (Maddux & Galinsky, 2009). Lastly, 
delaying first offers, because doing so tends to lead negotiators to share information and discuss 
more new options rather than just focusing on obvious existing issues such as sale price, helps to 
form creative agreements (Sinaceur et al., 2013).  
1.3. My prior work 
 In addition to this published work, I have also generated research on when and why 
negotiators generate creative agreements. First, we examined the effect of external structure—
specifically, the effect of the size of the bargaining zone. According to the interlocking self-
regulation model (Brett et al., 1999), parties set a goal and look for discrepancies between their 
goal and the situation, such as the proposal being offered by the other party. Feedback about a 
discrepancy between the situation and a goal typically leads to taking actions to reduce the gap. 
In that regard, as the size of bargaining zone decreases and turns negative, parties should 
experience increasingly large discrepancies between the situation and their goal that are not 
resolvable by simply pushing the other party harder. Parties could reduce the discrepancy by 
reducing their goals and so allowing new levels of concession-making. But they could also 
reduce the discrepancy by changing the situation. Specifically, they could seek to change the 
issues under discussion to reduce the gap and meet their goal. Accordingly, we varied the size of 
the bargaining zone on the central issue in a negotiation simulation exercise to form a large 
positive bargaining zone, a small positive bargaining zone, or a negative bargaining zone. As 
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predicted, dyads in the negative bargaining zone condition were most likely to generate creative 
agreements, followed by dyads in the small positive bargaining zone condition, and lastly by 
dyads in the large positive bargaining zone condition. Therefore, consistent with self-regulation 
models (and the basic satisficing claim, (Simon, 1956), if negotiators can achieve their initial 
goals directly without redefining issues, they are likely to do so without forming creative 
agreements. But disrupting their ability to meet their goals in a straightforward way makes 
parties more likely to consider changing the issues under discussion and so forming creative 
agreements. Thus, the result showed that creative agreements are more likely to be formed when 
the external situation makes non-creative outcomes less appealing to negotiators. 
In additional research, we also tested the effect of different kinds of goals on forming 
creative agreements. In one study, we tested the role of focusing on interests as a means to 
promote the formation of creative agreements. There are longstanding prescriptive arguments 
about the importance of interests, rather than positions, to forming integrative agreements (Fisher 
& Ury, 1981; Follett, 1940; Pruitt, 1981; Walton & McKersie, 1965). This is because a focus on 
interests should provide the flexibility to redefine the problem that negotiators encounter, 
whereas positions should limit flexibility. Surprisingly, empirical research on negotiation has not 
provided close tests of this prescription. There is work showing that sharing information about 
which issues are more and less important fosters forming tradeoffs (e.g., Adair, Okumura, & 
Brett, 2001; Weingart, Brett, Olekalns, & Smith, 2007). But apart from this work on information 
sharing, there is no work showing the effects of attending to one’s own interests and no work 
specifically connecting interests to redefining the negotiation problem and forming creative 
agreements, which was the original prescription. Further, there is ample work showing the value 
of focusing on targets to promote forming tradeoffs (e.g., Galinsky, Leonardelli, Okhuysen, & 
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Mussweiler, 2005; Galinsky, Mussweiler, & Medvec, 2002). Targets are a form of position, as 
they are specific, concrete outcome achievable in the negotiation. Consequently, despite strong 
arguments and conventional wisdom to focus on interests, the empirical support actually shows 
value in focusing on positions. However, the prescriptions about interests emphasize the value of 
interests to providing the flexibility needed to redefine what is under negotiation. The research 
on targets emphasizes the value of setting concrete, specific goals on motivating performance, 
and finds these effects in well-defined negotiation situations (scorable games) that do not allow 
parties to redefine what is under negotiation. But in a situation that allows parties to redefine the 
issues, we should be able to provide evidence for interests, rather than positions, to foster 
forming creative agreements. Consistent with this reasoning assertions, parties encouraged to 
consider their interests before the negotiation were more likely to generate creative agreements 
than parties encouraged to focus on their targets and more than parties encouraged to focus on 
their bottom lines. Showing the importance of flexibility that interests provide, those told to 
focus on targets were no more likely to form creative agreements than those focused on their 
bottom lines, in contrast to prior work showing that focusing on targets is more effective than 
focusing on bottom lines for forming tradeoffs in well-defined, scorable game exercises.  
Extending this study, we tested a form of the “firm flexibility” prescription (Pruitt, 
1983b): being firm with respect to basic interests but flexible about how to meet those interests 
fosters forming creative agreements. If negotiators are only being firm, they are unlikely to 
consider redefining the issues under discussion and so unlikely to form creative agreements. This 
is what we found with the “targets” condition in the prior study. But if negotiators are only being 
flexible, they are likely to make concessions instead of pushing themselves to consider other 
approaches to meet their interests. Thus, being both firm to avoid concessions and flexible to 
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increase openness to redefining issues is likely to be more helpful than either firmness alone or 
flexibility alone. In this study, having already seen a detrimental effect of firmness alone, 
negotiators were encouraged either to be flexible or both firm and flexible. We found that pairs 
in the firm and flexible condition were more likely to form creative agreements than pairs in the 
flexible condition.  
In addition, consistent with the earlier discussion about effective coordinated 
communication, analyzing the negotiation transcripts revealed that information sharing about 
interests was not sufficient to form creative agreements. There was no significant difference 
between conditions in the amount of information shared about interests. However, those in the 
firm and flexible condition were more likely to recognize and make use of information about 
interests to redefine issues. Thus, the critical factor for forming creative agreements was not 
sharing information about interests but recognizing and using such information to form creative 
agreements. 
Following up this finding about effective coordinated communication and the need to do 
more than just share information, we tested the effect of negotiators’ motivational orientation 
toward the situation on forming creative agreements. Specifically, we contrasted parties 
encouraged to adopt a learning orientation with parties encouraged to adopt a performance 
orientation. We predicted that negotiators oriented towards learning from the negotiation 
situation would be more likely to be open to new information, and so be more willing to redefine 
issues to form creative agreements than negotiators oriented towards performance. The results 
showed that dyads in the learning condition were more likely to form creative agreements than 
dyads in the presenting condition. Thus, rather than focusing on the information or initial 
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interpretation, trying to learn about the other party and the current negotiation situation appeared 
to help to create value.  
In a follow-up study on effective coordinated communication, we sought further evidence 
of the importance of not just sharing information but listening to and being open to information 
shared by the other side. Here, one condition was encouraged to share key information with the 
other side and the other condition was encouraged to ask questions about the other side’s key 
information. The transcripts revealed that parties in the two conditions shared the same amount 
of information about their interests. Critically though, it was the group encouraged to ask 
questions that put that information about interests to use, forming creative agreements at a higher 
rate than those encouraged to share information. Thus, not just sharing but also listening to what 
the other party is saying is critical for effective coordinated communication, redefining the issues 
under discussion, and forming creative agreements.  
To conclude, this line of work suggests several factors that are likely to be important to 
predict when and why negotiators redefine issues and form creative agreements. Situations that 
do not allow initial goals to be achieved, such as negative bargaining zones on initial issues, 
seem likely to prompt creative efforts. Being not only firm but also flexible, focusing on one’s 
interests, taking a learning orientation, and asking questions also all found support. Together, 
these findings contribute to our understanding of when and why parties form creative 
agreements. 
1.4. Motivation and contribution of the dissertation research 
Many real world negotiations allow parties to redefine the issues under discussion. 
Discovery of what parties could be discussing should be a central part of negotiation research. 
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The emerging literature and our previous work suggest several factors for creative agreements, 
but these findings also raise a new question. There are different ways to redefine the issues under 
discussion in a negotiation. Parties might discover and add entirely new issues (Sinaceur et al., 
2013). Or, parties could unbundle a current issue (Loewenstein & Howell, 2010). This raises the 
question of whether factors simply increase redefining issues and forming creative agreements 
generally, or whether there are different pathways that lead to forming different kinds of creative 
agreements. The literature on negotiation has generally assumed that there could be one set of 
factors that foster forming integrative agreements. Yet this literature has nearly exclusively relied 
on identifying when parties form tradeoffs in well-defined negotiation situations. Studying 
negotiation situations that allow parties to redefine the issues in different ways could allow 
research on whether some factors encourage redefining the negotiation in some ways and other 
factors encourage redefining the negotiation in other ways. Some work has found factors that 
lead parties to form creative agreements in situations that allowed them to add issues (e.g., 
Maddux et al., 2008; Tasa, Celani, & Bell, 2013). Other work has found factors that lead parties 
to form creative agreements in situations that allowed them to unbundle issues (Butler, 1994; 
e.g., Butler, 1999; Loewenstein & Howell, 2010). No work has tried to examine factors that 
might specifically lead parties to add new issues or factors that might specifically lead parties to 
unbundle new issues. It is possible that there are different factors and pathways that foster 
forming different kinds of creative agreements. If so, identifying such factors would advance our 
understanding of how negotiators form creative agreements and would allow us to provide more 
useful prescriptions. Thus, this dissertation investigates whether a factor might influence whether 
parties unbundle an existing issue, specifically, or might influence whether parties add a new 
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issue, specifically, and so show that there is merit to considering different kinds of value creation 
as resulting from different kinds of factors.  
The current research examines whether construal level might be a factor that 
differentially leads to adding or unbundling. Previous negotiation research demonstrated that 
construal level can foster forming integrative agreements using well-defined negotiation 
situations (e.g., Giacomantonio, De Dreu, & Mannetti, 2010; Henderson & Trope, 2009; 
Henderson, Trope, & Carnevale, 2006; Wening, Keith, & Abele, 2015). The current research 
extends this work on construal level to explore its effects on negotiations that allow parties to 
redefine the issues under consideration. In what follows, I first discuss two different types of 
creative agreements, and how and why construal level would be related to generating these 
different creative agreements.  
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CHAPTER 2 
TYPES OF CREATIVE AGREEMENTS 
 
2.1. Literature review 
2.1.1. Types of creative agreements: unbundling and adding   
Creative agreements can be defined as those resulting from redefining the issues under 
consideration. The negotiation literature has identified two main types of creative agreements: 
“unbundling” and “adding” (Lax & Sebenius, 1986, 2006; Pruitt, 1981; Thompson, 1998). 
Unbundling, which is also called as fractionation (Fisher, 1964) or unlinking (Pruitt, 1981; Pruitt 
& Carnevale, 1993), involves separating an issue into components and then certain components 
are traded, altered or dropped. The classic example of unbundling is two sisters dividing an 
orange (Follett, 1940): rather than cutting the orange in half, they separated it into the peel for 
one sister’s baking and the fruit to make juice for the other sister. Negotiations between Egypt 
and Israel over the Sinai are a real world example of unbundling (Fisher & Ury, 1981). Their 
negotiations appeared to be a classic example of a zero-sum negotiation if parties were just to 
negotiate over what percentage of the land each party would obtain. Each square mile gain for 
one party means a square mile lost to the other party. However, they unbundled the Sinai: Egypt 
wanted sovereignty over the Sinai and so was given the land back, whereas Israel wanted 
security and so the land was demilitarized. As seen in both the orange example and the Sinai 
example, the general approach to creating value by unbundling is to break down an original issue 
into components, so that the components can be traded off or discarded, leaving parties with 
more of what they want and less of what they do not want.  
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There are few empirical studies examining unbundling. One study by Butler (1999) 
showed that increasing trust led to increased information exchange, and increased rates of 
creative agreements due to unbundling. An unpublished study by Loewenstein and Howell 
(2010) showed that increased understanding of one’s own interests led to increased rates of 
unbundling an existing issue.  
Adding issues involves negotiators identifying and including new issues beyond those 
initially under discussion. For instance, through the course of discussion over the price of a 
product, a buyer can propose to include a warranty after recognizing the seller’s confidence on 
the quality of the product and the buyer’s concern for price resulting from a concern over the 
product’s reliability. Adding new issues is commonly seen in negotiations. For example, job 
negotiations frequently consider new terms such as spousal hires, educational leave, clothing 
allowances, travel support, and so forth (Rousseau, 2001).  
Several empirical papers have used negotiation situations that allow for adding new 
issues to the discussion. For instance, when negotiators take the other party’s perspective, they 
appear to be more likely to add new issues (Galinsky et al., 2008). A second paper found that 
strategic behavioral mimicry helps to build trust, increase information sharing, and thereby 
increase the rate of adding new issues to create value (Maddux et al., 2008). Positive affect also 
appears to increase trust and information sharing, and as a result lead to adding a new issue to 
create value (Anderson & Thompson, 2004). Thus, there is some evidence that trust and 
information sharing are relevant to both unbundling issues and adding issues to create value. But 
none of this research has focused on what specifically is involved in unbundling issues or adding 
issues.  
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Previous work has assumed that the same factors lead to forming any integrative 
agreement. Negotiators are typically encouraged to share high-level information about their 
interests, such as their overarching preferences or priorities, rather than focusing on the details of 
each issue as the means to generate integrative agreements (e.g., Thompson, 1991; Weingart et 
al., 2007). Sharing broad, high-level information presumably would be helpful for understanding 
the big picture of the negotiation situation. Parties should be stepping back from the immediately 
available issues and thinking about the broader situation. As new issues external to the already 
apparent ones are presumably only to be found by thinking beyond what is already under 
discussion, thinking about the broader situation could be useful for promoting the addition of 
new issues. However, it is not clear if that would be helpful for unbundling issues.  
Unbundling issues would seem to require understanding what specific, detailed elements 
of the issues are necessary or unnecessary to customize the best terms for the parties. Stepping 
back from the available issues would presumably not foster unbundling them but turning to 
alternative issues instead. The first step to unbundling is presumably examining components of 
the existing issue, and analyzing each component to identify its role and value. Following these 
steps, parties may be able to find which components are helpful to meet their interests and which 
components are not necessary for their interests. By analyzing the components, parties could 
disaggregate an existing issue, redefine it, and so form creative agreements. Thus, while adding 
seems to be fostered by thinking at a high-level about the broad situation, unbundling seems to 
be fostered by thinking about the details. If this intuition holds, then factors that promote 
thinking broadly might foster adding new issues whereas factors that promote thinking about 
details might foster unbundling existing issues.  
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2.1.2. Construal level theory 
The difference between taking a wide view to see the broad purpose of a negotiation and 
having a detailed focus on an existing issue within the negotiation is the same kind of difference 
drawn by work on high and low construal levels. Construal level theory (Liberman & Trope, 
1998; for a review, see Trope & Liberman, 2010) proposes that people mentally construe objects 
and events at different levels of abstraction. High-level construals expand one’s mental horizon 
so as to see the forest rather than each tree. On the contrary, low-level construals contract one’s 
mental horizon so as to focus on the trees rather than the forest. For example, Liberman and 
Trope (1998) showed that when participants were asked to describe their behavior which would 
occur in the distant future, they described their behavior in an abstract way (e.g., I broaden my 
horizon by reading a science fiction book). When participants considered their behavior would 
occur in the near future, they used more concrete descriptions (e.g., I read a science fiction book 
by flipping pages). The key premise of this theory is that close objects, events, or individuals 
tend to be represented concretely and in detail, whereas distant objects, events, or individuals 
tend to be represented abstractly and broadly.  
Construal level influences individuals’ information processing (Förster, Epstude, & 
Özelsel, 2009; Forster, Ozelsel, & Epstude, 2010), knowledge representation (Liberman, 
Sagristano, & Trope, 2002), prediction (Henderson, Fujita, Trope, & Liberman, 2006; 
Nussbaum, Liberman, & Trope, 2006), decision making (Goodman & Malkoc, 2012; Pronin, 
Olivola, & Kennedy, 2008), and negotiation (Giacomantonio, De Dreu, Shalvi, Sligte, & Leder, 
2010; Wening et al., 2015). For example, Henderson, Trope, and Carnevale (2006) found that 
adopting high-level construals led negotiators to consider multiple issues at the same time, which 
in turn led to forming tradeoffs. However, adopting low-level construals led negotiators to 
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consider each issue separately, which prevented forming tradeoffs. Similarly, Wening et al. 
(2015) found that adopting high-level construals led negotiators to exchange information about 
the broad situation, and in turn, they were more likely to form tradeoffs than negotiators with 
low-level construals who exchanged less information about the broad situation.  
If negotiation issues are clearly defined and noticeably different in value between parties, 
then adopting a high-level construal so as to consider the whole situation is likely to help parties 
consider a package deal rather than fight for each issue individually. In this setting, adopting a 
low-level construal to focus on each issue separately would not help to see which issue is more 
important and which issue is less important and so prevent forming tradeoffs. However, this may 
be due to the situation more than the fact that high-level construals are always crucial to forming 
integrative agreements. For example, Giacomantonio, De Dreu, and Mannetti (2010) generated a 
negotiation exercise in which parties saw clusters of issues. If there was a tradeoff possible only 
at the level of the cluster of issues, then adopting a high-level construal made finding the tradeoff 
more likely than adopting a low-level construal. But if there was a tradeoff possible only at the 
level of individual issues within a cluster, then adopting a low-level construal made finding the 
tradeoff more likely than adopting a high-level construal. Thus, the intriguing possibility raised 
by this work is that construal levels direct attention to different aspects of a situation, and the 
situation may or may not allow for value creation at those different aspects. It is not that high-
level construals are always better than low-level construals for forming integrative agreements. 
The question arises then of why integrative potential would be located at the level of the broad 
situation or at the level of the specifics. In the Giacomantonio et al.’s (2010) study , the 
integrative potential was available at different levels because that was how the negotiation 
scenario was designed. The question is whether certain kinds of integrative potential are likely to 
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reside at high levels in the big picture of the negotiation and other kinds of integrative potential 
are likely to reside at low levels in the details of the negotiation.  
2.2 Conceptual framework and hypotheses 
2.2.1. Construal level for unbundling and adding 
The possibility examined in the work that follows is that different construal levels lead to 
focusing on different kinds of information when planning for a negotiation, different kinds of 
information discussed during negotiations, and different kinds of creative agreements. 
Specifically, based on construal level theory, negotiators with a low-level construal are likely to 
focus on concrete information in the situation rather than the broad aims. For instance, Förster, 
Friedman and  Liberman (2004) showed that participants primed with a low-level construal 
performed better than participants primed with a high-level construal in an analytical task that 
relied on processing concrete information. Similarly, Pfeiffer et al. (2014) demonstrated that 
people with low-level construals were superior to people with high-level construals at detecting 
omissions, which requires greater attention to details. Thus, during planning, negotiators with a 
low-level construal are likely to focus on information about the details and concrete features of 
the existing issues rather than the broad aims of the entire negotiation situation. This focus, in 
turn, is likely to yield to greater elaboration in their planning notes about details. Therefore:  
Hypothesis 1a: Negotiators with low-level construals will focus on information about an 
existing issue during their planning more than those with high-level construals. 
There should be consequences of focusing on the details of the existing issues when 
planning for negotiations. Specifically, if it turns out that it is possible to unbundle an existing 
issue, then parties who focus on the details of the existing issues should be more likely to notice 
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the key information needed to unbundle the issue. For instance, to return to Follett’s elegant two 
sisters and the orange example once more, if the sisters are considering detailed information 
about the existing issue, that is, the orange (e.g., “I need this orange which should contain 4 
tablespoons of juice” or “I want the peel of this orange so that I can obtain at least a tablespoon 
of orange zest), they are more likely to consider key information (i.e., the juice or peel of the 
orange) than if they were focused on the larger background (I want this orange because I am 
thirsty or because I am baking). As the key information for unbundling resides in the detailed 
information about the existing issues, the more detailed information about the existing issues 
parties consider, the more likely they should be to consider the key information for unbundling. 
Therefore:  
Hypothesis 1b: Focusing on information linked to an existing issue will be positively 
associated with focusing on information linked to unbundling the existing issue.  
Having consider the key information for unbundling during planning should, in turn, 
make parties more likely to make use of that information during their negotiations. Specifically, 
parties should be more likely to form an agreement that unbundles an existing issue if they noted 
the potential relevance of a detail of the main issue during planning. As in the two sisters and the 
orange example, sisters who were thinking about juice and orange peels in advance of the 
discussion should be more likely to divide the orange effectively than sisters who were thinking 
about oranges. More generally, negotiators who focus on the key information for unbundling 
during their planning could be expected to be particularly likely to craft a deal that unbundles an 
existing issue. Thus:  
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Hypothesis 1c: The more dyads focus on information linked to unbundling the existing 
issue during their planning, the more likely they are to form agreements that unbundle 
the existing issue.  
Distinct from low construal, key details, and unbundling, a second pathway also likely 
exists. Negotiators with a high-level construal could be expected to approach their negotiation 
situation by attending to the broad purpose of why they are negotiating and the background 
situation in which their negotiation plays a role. Consistent with this proposal, Shani, Igou and 
Zeelenberg (2009) demonstrated that people with high-level construals were less interested in 
searching through the concrete features of information than people with lower level of 
construals. In addition, Alter, Oppenheimer and Zemla (2010) showed that if people adopt a 
high-level construal, they orient their attention to the overall function or purpose of a device 
while ignoring the various components of the device. Brought to the negotiation context, 
adopting a high-level construal should lead negotiators to focus on the broad aims of the 
negotiation situation during planning and so emphasis background information in their planning 
notes. Therefore:  
Hypothesis 2a: Negotiators with high-level construals will focus information about th 
broad aims of the negotiation during their planning more than those with low-level 
construals.  
The more parties focus on information about the broad aims of the negotiation during 
planning, the more chances they have to take into consideration the key information for adding 
new issues to the negotiation. For example, when an employee considers the broad purpose of 
their job negotiation (e.g., “I need a higher salary to pay back my student loans”), they are more 
likely to consider key information (i.e., student loans) beyond existing issues (e.g., salary, start 
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date) that could then provide the basis for adding new issues (e.g., participation in a loan 
repayment assistance program). As the key information for adding resides in the broader purpose 
of the negotiation situation, the more parties emphasize information about the broad aims of the 
negotiation, the more likely they should be to consider the key information for adding. 
Therefore: 
Hypothesis 2b: Focusing on information linked to the broad aims of the negotiation will 
be positively associated with focusing on information linked to adding new issues.  
If negotiators focus on key information for adding new issues during planning, they 
should be more likely to incorporate an additional issue in their final agreement. Identifying key 
information for adding new issues during planning increases negotiators’ chances for considering 
key information for adding, responding positively when another party raises the information, and 
eases understanding how to make use of the information to redefine the issues under discussion. 
Accordingly, when negotiators take critical information for adding new issues to the case into 
consideration when they prepare for their negotiation, they are more likely to generate an 
agreement that adds a new issue than negotiators who do not identify key information during 
planning. Therefore: 
Hypothesis 2c: The more dyads focus on information linked to adding new issues during 
their planning, they more likely they are to form agreements that add new issues.  
2.2.2. Mixed construal levels and creative agreements  
If low-level construals foster unbundling existing issues and high-level construals foster 
adding new issues, then a natural next question is whether it is possible to capitalize on both 
construal levels and form creative agreements that both unbundle and add issues. After all, 
prescriptively it would be useful for negotiators if there were a way to maximize value creation.  
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One possibility is that each party in a dyad might have a different construal level. If one 
party adopts a high construal level and the other adopts a low construal level, then they could be 
expected to focus on different types of information during their planning. When they negotiate, 
each party is then likely to mention different kinds of information. If the information is clear and 
unambiguous, then this might be effective. However, it the information is ambiguous, then 
having the two parties focused on difference kinds of information is likely to result in parties 
ignoring what the other party is saying because it does not seem relevant to them or it might lead 
to confusion. For instance, Loewenstein and Moore (2004) found that when there is only one 
obvious interpretation for information, information sharing led to convergence of expectations 
and increased negotiation efficiency. By contrast, when information could be interpreted in 
multiple ways, information sharing led to divergence of expectations and decreased negotiation 
efficiency. As the information needed to add new issues and unbundle existing issues is likely to 
be ambiguous—without information from the other side, it is not clear whether the information is 
useful or not—this raises doubts about the value of each party adopting a different construal 
level. It might simply result in confusion and missed opportunities.  
In contrast to each party in a negotiation adopting a different construal level, an 
alternative is for each party to consider the situation using both high-level and low-level 
construals. If parties individually consider a situation using both a high-level construal and a 
low-level construal, then they are likely to consider both the broad situation and background 
aims for negotiating as well as the details of an existing issue. Consequently, when they interact 
with each other, not only are they likely to share information about the background situation and 
details of the existing issue like parties who each adopt a different construal level, but they are 
also likely to understand each other. Consequently, mixed construal levels within each party, 
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more so than mixed construal levels between parties, is more likely to result in meaningful 
conversations and so forming creative agreements that both unbundle existing issues and add 
new issues. Thus:  
Hypothesis 3: Dyads whose members consider both high-level and low-level construals 
will be more likely to generate deals that both add new issues and unbundle an existing 
issue than dyads whose members consider either a high-level or a low-level construal 
that different to each other.  
The process model implied by the argument just made is that parties who adopt both a 
high-level construal and a low-level construal are likely to have different experiences during 
planning than parties who adopt just one construal level. Adopting just one construal level is 
likely, as noted previously, to lead parties to focus on either the broad background situation or 
the details of the existing issue. In contrast, adopting both a high-level construal and a low-level 
construal is likely to provide opportunities for individuals to considering information about the 
broad aims (when adopting a high-level construal) and also information about the details of the 
current issue (when adopting a low-level construal). Thus:  
Hypothesis 4a. Negotiators adopting both high-level and low-level construals will be 
more likely than those adopting either a high-level or a low-level construal to focus on 
both information linked to broad aims of the negotiation and information linked to the 
existing issue during their planning. 
The information on which parties focus during planning is likely to shape the discussions 
that the parties have. The more parties focus on the broad background situation during planning, 
the more they should discuss such information and so discuss the key information for adding 
new issues. Likewise, the more parties focus on the details of the existing issue during planning, 
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the more they should discuss such details during their negotiation and the more likely they 
should be to discuss the key information for unbundling the current issue. As a result, parties 
who adopt both a high-level and a low-level construal generate information about both the 
background situation and the details of the existing issues during planning are particularly likely 
to discuss the key information for adding new issues as well as the key information for 
unbundling existing issue. Thus: 
Hypothesis 4b: Focusing on both information linked to broad aims and information 
linked to an existing issue will be positively related to discussing both information linked 
to adding new issues and information linked to unbundling the existing issue.  
Negotiation discussions are predictive of the kinds of agreements parties form, as 
indicated by longstanding discussions of information sharing and integrative agreements (e.g., 
Fisher & Ury, 1981; Pruitt, 1981). For example, Weingart and her colleagues (2007) showed that 
different types of information exchange led to different negotiation outcomes. Based on their 
negotiation process analysis, for example, information related to preferences or priorities led to 
parties generating integrative agreements (tradeoffs) whereas information relates to facts 
promoted the generation of distributive agreements. Following a similar logic, if parties discuss 
key information about the broad aims of the case that could lead negotiators to add new issues, 
then they should be likely to form agreements that incorporate additional issues. If parties 
discuss key information about the key details of the existing issue, that could lead negotiators to 
unbundle the existing issue. Accordingly, parties who discuss both key information for adding 
new issues and key information for unbundling the existing issue are particularly likely to form 
creative agreements that both add and unbundle issues. Therefore: 
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Hypothesis 4c: Discussing both information linked to adding new issues and information 
linked to unbundling the existing issue will be positively associated with generating deals 
that both add new issues and unbundle the existing issue.  
2.3. Overview of the current experiments 
The experiments that follow provide tests of the relationship between construal levels and 
types of creative agreements. The first experiment tests the effects of high-level and low-level 
construal on types of creative agreements. The second experiment tests the predictions about 
mixed construal levels within each party versus between parties on forming creative agreements 
that both add and unbundle issues. The two experiments are lab experiments so as to allow for 
asking detailed questions before and after the negotiation, recording the negotiation discussions, 
lengthy interventions to encourage adopting a given construal level, and control over the design 
of the negotiation situation so as to allow for both adding and unbundling. Pilot work established 
feasible interventions to encourage adopting particular construal levels. Additional pilot work 
established a negotiation simulation exercise allowing for adding and unbundling issues, 
ensuring that each was roughly equivalent in difficulty, and ensuring that the level of difficulty 
and context was suited to the participant population.  
2.4. Experiment 1: Construal level as an influence on unbundling and adding 
Parties could create value by unbundling an existing issue like Follett’s example of the 
sisters and orange, or by adding new issues as in including continuing education support in job 
negotiations. For unbundling, parties need to consider the specific elements of an existing issue 
to figure out if any are of greater or lesser value, or even unnecessary. For adding, parties need to 
consider information about the broader situation to identify other possible issues. The two forms 
of creating value, unbundling and adding, appear to be distinct. They seem to call for adopting a 
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different scope of attention and seem to require considering different types of information, each 
of which seems to call for a different construal level. Thus, the main goal of Experiment 1 is to 
examine whether adopting either a high or low construal level leads to focusing on different 
types of information, and in turn, generating different types of creative agreements.  
Experiment 1 tests the first six hypotheses. If parties are encouraged to adopt low-level 
construals, they could be expected to focus on information related to the details of an existing 
issue. If they focus on the details of the existing issue, they could then be expected to spend at 
least some time focused on the key details needed to unbundle the existing issue. As a result, 
they should be more likely to make use of those details and form an agreement that creates value 
by unbundling the existing issue. If, on the other hand, parties are encouraged to adopt high-level 
construals, they could be expected to focus on information related to the broad aims of the case 
that gave rise to the specific negotiation. If they focus on the broad aims, they could then be 
expected to spend at least some time focused on the key information needed to add a new issue 
to the negotiation. Consequently, they should be more likely to make use of the information 
about the broad aims to form a deal that creates value by adding new issues. To test these 
predictions, both parties in a dyad were encouraged to adopt either a low-level construal or a 
high-level construal, then their focus and negotiation outcomes were assessed.  
Method 
Participants and design. A total of 114 undergraduate students from a large Midwestern 
university participated in the study to receive extra credit for a class. Participants were randomly 
paired, and each dyad was randomly assigned to either the low-level construal condition (N = 
58), or the high-level construal condition (N = 56).  
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Negotiation task. I participated in developing a new negotiation exercise that provides 
opportunities to add and unbundle issues and that yields quantifiable agreements (see Appendix 
A for the full materials). The exercises involves a tenant and a potential subtenant discussing a 
summer sublet. The tenant wants $1,560 for the summer sublet and needs at least $1,400 whereas 
the potential subtenant wants to sublease the studio apartment for $1,140 and can pay up to 
$1,300. At first glance, it seems to be a distributive bargaining situation with a negative 
bargaining zone. However, two different types of value creating options are embedded in the 
scenario. First, the apartment includes a parking space that the potential subtenant does not need. 
As there is information in the exercise about an outside party looking for a parking place over the 
summer, the parties could unbundle the parking space from the rest of the apartment and rent the 
parking space separately. Second, the potential subtenant wants to sell two textbooks, and the 
tenant needs to buy those exact books. Thus, the parties could add the issue of textbooks to their 
negotiation. Altogether, the negotiation exercise is very likely to lead parties to discuss the price 
for subleasing the apartment, and allows parties to discover that they could unbundle the parking 
space from the apartment itself and could add a textbook sale to the apartment lease.  
The different agreements are readily quantified. If parties make a simple price deal, it will 
result in a total joint loss to the two parties of $100, since the minimum acceptable price ($1,400) 
for the tenant is higher than the maximum amount ($1,300) the potential subtenant can pay. If 
they impasse, the total value obtained by the two parties is zero. If they unbundle the parking 
space, it will increase joint gains by $180, resulting in a total joint gain of $80 to the two parties. 
If they add textbooks, it will increase joint gains by $180, resulting in a total joint gain of $80 to 
the two parties. If they form a deal with both adding and unbundling issues, it will increase joint 
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gains by $360, resulting in a total joint gain of $260. Each party’s individual gains will vary with 
the deal terms, but the joint gains for the different possible outcomes are clear.  
Procedure. Participants signed up for the study online. Upon their arrival at the 
laboratory, they were randomly assigned to dyads, conditions, and roles. Each dyad worked in 
their own room. Participants were seated separately in front of computers. All instructions were 
presented on computers, with the exception of negotiation role materials, which they received on 
paper. They read their role materials, answered questions, and engaged in the construal level 
manipulation. When both parties were ready to negotiate, they moved to a table away from the 
computers, the experimenter turned on recording equipment, and then left the room while they 
held their discussions. After negotiating, participants returned to their computers to report their 
negotiation agreements and complete questionnaires. Then, they were debriefed, thanked, and 
dismissed. 
Construal level manipulation. Adapting materials developed by Alter, Oppenheimer, and 
Zelma (2010), construal level was manipulated by asking participants to complete a mindset 
prime. Specifically, participants were asked about two daily activities, backing up a computer 
and driving a car. Participants in the low-level construal condition described the concrete details 
that are involved in doing each of those activities. Participants in the high-level construal 
condition described the abstract reasons for doing each of the activities. Then, participants read 
their negotiation role materials. Afterwards, they were asked to provided either the concrete 
details of the situation (for the low-level construal condition) or the abstract reasons for the 
situation (for the high-level construal condition; see Appendix B for the instructions).  
Manipulation check. The check on whether the construal-level manipulation was 
effective was the number of words that participants used to describe their negotiation during 
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planning. As construal level theory posits that low construal levels imply a focus on concrete 
details and high construal levels imply a focus on broad abstractions, the number of words 
provides an indication of construal level because those with low-level construals are likely to 
need more words to describe the case details and those with high-level construals are likely to 
need fewer words to indicate the broad points. Thus, the length of participants’ descriptions were 
used as a check of the construal level manipulation. 
Focus on the existing issue. The number of descriptions regarding the details of the 
existing issue, subleasing an apartment, were counted in participants’ descriptions of the case 
during their planning to measure their focus on the existing issue. Specifically, the details 
included information about the apartment such as its location and its amenities. Examples were 
“My apartment is a 5-minute walk from the business school” or “My apartment has high speed 
internet.”  
Focus on information linked to unbundling the existing issue. The number of 
statements about the key information for unbundling the existing issue made during planning 
were counted to evaluate participants’ focus on the key information for unbundling. Based on the 
role materials, participants could unbundle the existing issue by subleasing the parking space to 
someone else. To do this, the key information for unbundling is having a parking space (from the 
tenant’s role materials) or having no car (from the potential subtenant’s role materials). From the 
tenant’s role, an example was “My apartment includes a free parking space.” From the potential 
subtenant’s role, an example was “I’m looking for a place close to the school since I don’t have a 
car.”  
Focus on broad aims. The number of statements made on participants’ planning 
documents regarding the broad aims were coded. The tenant wants to sublease the apartment 
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because this party is going back home whereas the potential subtenant needed a place to stay 
over the summer to take classes. Thus, examples of the broad aims in this case were “I will go 
back home, so I don’t need to live here” or “I need somewhere to live for the summer for my 
class.”  
Focus on information linked to adding new issues. The number of statements about the 
key information for adding the textbook issue made during planning were counted. The key 
information for adding is looking to buy two textbooks (from the tenant’s role materials) or to 
sell two textbooks (from the potential subtenant’s role materials). From the tenant’s role, an 
example was “I need to sublease my apartment to buy textbooks.” From the potential subtenant’s 
role, an example was “I need to sublease an apartment, while also I need to sell textbooks to 
someone else.”  
Unbundling. If the terms of the agreement include separating the parking space from the 
apartment, the outcome was coded as including unbundling. 
Adding. If terms of agreement included textbooks, the outcome was coded as including 
adding. 
Negotiation perceptions between the two conditions. To examine the potential for the 
construal manipulations to impose different levels of task difficulty or cognitive effort, which 
can influence the formation of integrative agreements (e.g., De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003; 
Eliashberg, Gauvin, Lilien, & Rangaswamy, 1992), participants were asked to report their 
perceptions. Specifically, they rated how difficult the construal level manipulation was (i.e., 
describing daily activities), how difficult the negotiation preparation was, and how difficult it 
was to engage in the negotiation. Also, they reported how thoroughly they processed information 
during the task and their overall mood (see Appendix C for the questionnaires).   
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Value created. Using the case materials and the terms of the agreements, the total value 
created by an impasse was scored as $0, a simple price deal as -$100, a deal with unbundling as 
$80, a deal with adding as $80, and a deal with both adding and unbundling as $260.  
Negotiation process measures. Two coders listened to each negotiation and recorded 
every offer, exchange of information related to the items linked to the details (i.e., features of the 
apartment), key items for unbundling the existing issue (i.e., parking space or no car), items 
linked to the broad aims (i.e., broad purpose of the case), and key items for adding new issues 
(i.e., two textbooks). Inter-rater reliabilities were all above .75. 
Results 
Manipulation check. Those in the low construal level condition (M = 293.17, SD = 
148.21) tended to write longer descriptions of the case during planning than those in the high 
construal level condition (M = 219.68, SD = 123.43), t (112) = 2.87, p < .01. This is evidence 
that the construal manipulations successfully induced the different construal levels.   
The low construal to unbundling pathway. Correlations among variables are all shown 
in Table 1.  
Supporting Hypothesis 1a, construal level was associated with writing about the details of 
the existing issue (r = -.42, p < .05), as those in the low construal level condition tended to 
provide more statements about items linked to the apartment sublease (M = 2.21, SD = 1.82) 
than dyads in the high construal level condition (M = .89, SD = .96), t (55) = 3.39, p < .05 (Table 
2).  
Writing more statements about details of the existing issue was, in turn, associated with 
writing about the key items for unbundling (r = .46, p < .05). Focusing on the key items for 
unbundling during planning was then correlated with forming deals that unbundled the main 
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issue (r = .46, p < .05). As this pattern indicates, and confirmed by a mediation analysis using 
Hayes’s (2013) PROCESS (model 6, default settings), there is a reliable indirect effect of 
construal level, through details and key details, on forming an agreement with unbundling, B = 
-.42 (95% bootstrap confidence interval from -1.32 to -.10). Figure 1 shows the full path model 
showing that low construal levels lead to more statements about details of the existing issue, 
which in turn leads to more statements about key details for unbundling the existing issue, and, 
finally, generating a deal that including unbundling the existing issue. Thus, Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 
and 1c were supported (Figure 1). 
The high construal to adding pathway. There was no clear evidence that construal level 
was associated with statements about the broad aims (r = .13, ns). Those in the high construal 
level condition tended to provide similar numbers of statements about items linked to the broad 
aims (M = .96, SD = .96) than those in the low construal level condition (M = .72, SD = .92), t 
(1, 55) = .96, ns. Writing about the broad aims was not correlated with writing about the key 
information for adding (r = -.05, ns). Nor was writing about key information for adding related to 
forming agreements that included adding (r = .25, ns). Unsurprisingly then, a similar mediation 
analysis found no sign of a pathway from high construal levels to forming agreements with 
added issues, B = -.00 (95% bootstrap confidence interval from -.18 to .04). Figure 2 illustrates 
the full model, which shows no support for Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c. 
Negotiator perceptions. An examination of negotiator perceptions showed no differences 
in perceived difficulties or in the extent of information processing based on the construal 
condition. Thus, the effect of the low construal condition does not seem to be due to a difference 
in perceived difficulty or information processing (Table 3). 
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Value created. As expected, parties who formed agreements that included unbundling the 
main issue tended to create more value (M = $117.50, SD = $74.67) than parties who did not (M 
= -$35.76, SD = $80.12), t (55) = 7.34, p < .001. Similarly, parties who formed agreements that 
included adding a new issue created more value (M = $144.29, SD = $89.50) than parties who 
did not (M = -$8.84, SD = $85.67), t (55) = 5.75, p < .001. There were no differences in value 
creation between two conditions since parties in each condition generated value by forming 
creative agreements in its own way, t (55) = 1.29, ns (Table 4).  
Negotiation process. An examination of the transcripts showed several trends. In both 
conditions, the early phase of the negotiations sounded alike. Negotiators mostly just negotiated 
price, and the initial prices were comparable in the two conditions. The first offer made, when 
made by tenants, was similar in two conditions (MLowCL = $785.00, SDLowCL = $51.43; MHighCL= 
$781.18, SDHighCL = $31.99), t (37) = .27, ns. So too were first offers when made by potential 
subtenants (MLowCL = $603.57, SDLowCL = $40.49; MHighCL= $579.09, SDHighCL = $38.07), t (16) = 
1.30, ns. The first counter-offers were also very similar in the two conditions. The first counter-
offers when made by the tenants (MLowCL = $730.00, SDLowCL = $32.79; MHighCL= $754.44, 
SDHighCL = $38.44) were alike, t (16) = 1.45, ns, as were the first counter-offers when made by 
the potential subtenants (MLowCL = $589.00, SDLowCL = $72.47; MHighCL= $603.16 SDHighCL = 
$32.50), t (37) = .78, ns. Also, first offers were nearly exclusively price offers (98%; 56 out of 
57) rather than including value creating options. Thus, although parties noted key information 
during planning, this did not result opening with discussions of such information. 
Parties did eventually discuss key information. The patterns for the amount of key 
information shared before one party offered a creative agreement is listed in Table 5. There was 
no difference due to construal condition on sharing the key information for unbundling or 
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adding. Surprisingly, dyads in the low construal level condition shared more information about 
the broad aims than the dyads in the high construal level condition, (MLowCL = 2.21, SDLowCL = 
1.84; MHighCL= 1.36 SDHighCL = 1.13), t (55) = 2.09, p < .05. A further observation is that the vast 
majority of the dyads shared information about the key information for unbundling (27 out of 29 
dyads in the low construal level condition, 27 out of 28 dyads in the high construal level 
condition), and the key information for adding (23 out of 29 dyads in the low construal level 
condition; 22 out of 28 dyads in the high construal level condition). Thus, sharing information 
was not the limitation to generating creative agreements. 
Discussion 
 Experiment 1 found that low construal levels could influence the formation of creative 
agreements due to unbundling the main issue. Most prior research has examined factors that 
influence forming integrative agreements without respect to the kind of integrative agreement. 
Consequently, this finding is novel in that it provides evidence that a specific factor (in this case, 
low-level construal) can lead to forming a specific kind of integrative agreement (unbundling).  
The study did not find evidence that adopting a high-level construal led to forming 
creative agreements by adding new issues. Examining the types of agreements in the high-level 
construal condition indicates that, if anything, a high-level construal increased the proportion of 
price deals. It is possible that this is a chance result. It is also possible that this indicates that a 
high-level construal might lead parties to consider the (big-picture) value of forming an 
agreement and pay less attention to the (detailed) fact that it involved taking a modest loss. That 
is, thinking about the broad, abstract reasons for negotiating might help some negotiators to 
focus on the broad aims and add issues, but it could also lead to an even more abstract level of 
reasoning that leads negotiators to focus simply on making a deal, any deal. If so, a further 
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question would be under what conditions high construal levels are helpful for creative 
agreements. If a negotiator could adopt not only high level construals but also low level 
construals, the negotiator might be able to consider both broad aims and the details of the 
situation. This range of reflection and consideration could be effective for identifying different 
sources of value. This possibility was explored in Experiment 2.   
 The negotiation planning and process data provide additional insights. That the planning 
information about the key aspects of the main issue was linked to low construal levels and to 
unbundling the original issue indicates that some level of understanding and attention to the 
existing issue is an important pre-condition to later using that information productively to form a 
creative agreement. However, it did not lead parties to start with that information. Parties were 
not simply figuring out during planning that they could add or unbundle the original issue, as 
they nearly all started with several pure price offers. Further, the process data showed that simply 
mentioning the key information during the negotiation itself was not predictive of making use of 
it to form creative agreements. The ambiguity of the information is likely the cause: is it just an 
overarching goal of the case and mere details as parties prepared for a price discussion, or was it 
key information to form a creative agreement? Parties could mention the information for 
mundane reasons. It seems more likely that chance favored prepared minds: parties who planned 
most thoughtfully about key information were probably most likely to notice the importance of 
the information when the other side mentioned it and continued discussing it. Consistent with 
this possibility, if parties talked about the key information repeatedly rather than just once (again, 
all before anyone proposed a creative agreement), that seems more likely to be an indicator that 
the parties are catching on to the information’s importance. And in fact, the number of mentions 
of key information for unbundling was correlated with forming an agreement than unbundled the 
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main issue and the number of mentions of key information for adding was correlated with 
forming an agreement that added another issue to the negotiation. All told then, construal levels 
appear to guide what information parties focus on and so are prepared to find important during 
their discussions, which in turn fosters using the information to form creative agreements.     
2.5. Experiment 2: Mixed construal levels 
If different construal levels might foster different outcomes, then it raises the question of 
how parties might form deals that include more than one type of outcome. Our own prior studies 
show that forming an agreement that both adds a new issue and unbundles the main issue is 
exceedingly rare. For example, work using the BlueLight exercise, an analog to the lease 
negotiation used in Experiment 1, shows that just 4% both added and unbundled issues. In 
Experiment 1, just 9% of the dyads both added and unbundled issues. Yet it is possible for 
people to consider the same situation using both a high-level construal and a low-level construal, 
one after another. The question is whether doing so might enable people to form agreements that 
both add and unbundle issues.   
As negotiations involve more than one person, there are two ways to examine the 
application of multiple construal levels. Each party could consider the negotiation situation from 
both construal levels. Or, one party could adopt one construal and the other party could adopt the 
other. Mixed construals within each person might encourage each person to consider a full range 
of information, which is likely to be beneficial. Mixed construals across parties might simply 
lead to misunderstandings or not finding relevant what the other party is discussing. Experiment 
2 examines these two conditions, mixed construal levels within each party or mixed construal 
levels between parties, and whether each leads to forming deals that both add and unbundle 
issues.  
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Method 
Participants and design. A total of 96 undergraduate students from a large Midwestern 
university participated in the study. Participants were assigned to a dyad and a role. Each dyad 
was randomly assigned to the condition of mixed construal levels within each party (N = 48), or 
the condition of mixed construal levels between parties (N = 48). 
Procedure. The process was the same as Experiment 1 except for the construal level 
manipulation. 
Construal level manipulation. For the condition of mixed construal levels within each 
party, participants engaged in both the high and low construal level manipulation tasks (see 
Appendix D for the instructions). For the condition of mixed construal levels between parties, 
one party received the high construal level manipulation instructions from Experiment 1 while 
the other party received the low construal level manipulation instructions from Experiment 1. To 
ensure each condition spent a similar amount of time on the manipulation and on their 
negotiation planning, participants in the mixed construal levels within each party condition only 
received half of the questions of each high and low construal level manipulation instructions. 
Additionally, they spent half of the time to describe their case in each during planning as 
compared to participants in the mixed construal levels between parties condition.  
Planning statements about information linked to the broad aims and information 
linked to the existing issue. As the focus of this study is on both adding and unbundling issues, 
the question was whether each party considered information about the broad aims of the case and 
information about the details of the main issue during planning. Thus, each dyad was coded as 0 
(no parties considered any items), 1 (one party considered one type of item or both parties 
considered the same type of item), 2 (one party considered both item types or both parties 
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considered one type of item each), 3 (one party considered both item types and the other 
considered only one type of item), and 4 (both parties considered both item types).  
Negotiation statements about information linked to the broad aims and information 
linked to the existing issue. From the negotiation discussion, the number of pieces of key 
information regarding adding (i.e., textbooks to sell or to buy) and unbundling (i.e., car or 
parking space) that parties shared were counted in the transcripts up until one party made an 
offer that proposed some kind of creative agreement (adding an issue, unbundling an issue, or 
both).  
Deal with both adding and unbundling. If the terms of the agreement include both 
adding textbooks and unbundling the parking space from the apartment, then it was considered 
as a deal with both adding and unbundling. 
Negotiation perceptions. Similar to Experiment 1, parties were asked for their 
perceptions about the manipulation and negotiation (see Appendix E for the questionnaires). 
Value created. The outcomes were scored as in Experiment 1. 
Results 
Deal with both adding and unbundling. Parties with mixed construal levels within each 
party (25%; 6 out of 24 dyads) generated deals that both added and unbundled issues more than 
parties with mixed construal levels between parties (0%; 0 out of 24 dyads), χ2 (1, N = 48) = 
6.86, p < .01, ϕ = .38, supporting Hypothesis 3.  
The mixed construals within each party to a deal with both adding and unbundling 
pathway. Correlations among variables are all shown in Table 6. Differences in planning on 
types of information (Table 7) and differences in discussing types of information (Table 8) 
between the two conditions follow.  
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Mixed construal levels within each party, relative to between parties, showed a marginal 
trend (r = .27, p < .10) to be linked to including both information about the broad aims and the 
detailed information about the original issue as part of planning (Table 6). Many (75%) of the 
mixed construal levels within each party dyads mentioned both kinds of information during 
planning, whereas only about half (46%) did so in the mixed construal levels between parties 
dyads (Table 9).  
Including both information about the broad aims and the detailed information about the 
existing issue as part of planning was correlated with sharing information about both key items 
for adding and key items for unbundling during the negotiation (r = .36, p < .05). Sharing 
information about both key items during the negotiation was, in turn, correlated with generating 
a deal with both adding and unbundling issues (r = .47, p < .01). Consistent with this pattern, an 
analysis using Hayes’s (2013) PROCESS (model 6, default settings) did not find a reliable 
indirect effect of mixed construal levels within each party, through planning and sharing, on 
forming an agreement with both adding and unbundling, B = .39 (95% bootstrap confidence 
interval from -.12 to 3.07). Figure 3 shows the full path model showing that the condition of 
mixed construal levels within each party shows a marginal trend to more planning statements 
about both the broad aims and the details about the existing issue, which in turn leads to more 
information sharing about key details for adding and unbundling, and, finally, generating a deal 
that includes both adding and unbundling issues. Thus, Hypotheses 4a, 4b, and 4c were 
supported (Figure 3). 
Negotiator perceptions. Participants who engaged in both the high and low construal 
level manipulation tasks (MMCL within = 3.46, SDMCL within = 1.58) tended to report that the 
manipulation tasks were more difficult than did participants who considered just the high 
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construal level or the low construal level (MMCL between = 2.79, SDMCL between = 1.56), t (94) = 2.08, 
p < .05 (Table 10). Those in mixed construals within each party condition showed a marginal 
trend towards finding preparing for negotiation to be more difficult (MMCL within = 3.56, SDMCL 
within = 1.49; MMCL between = 3.04, SDMCL between = 1.13), t (94) = 1.93, p < .10. Those in the mixed 
construals within each party condition (MMCL within = 3.85, SDMCL within = .80) were also more 
likely to report needing to think deeply more so than participants in the mixed construals 
between parties condition (MMCL between = 3.52, SDMCL between = .83), t (94) = 2.01, p < .05. As a 
result, it appears that needing to adjust one’s focus of attention by considering both high- and 
low-levels of construal is more difficult and requires more effort than just considering one level 
of construal.  
Value created. Dyads with mixed construals within each party (MMCL within = $76.67, SD 
= $26.75) tended to form more valuable agreements than dyads with mixed construals between 
parties (MMCL between = $1.67, SD = $18.21), t (46) = 2.32, p < .05. This outcome stemmed from 
more agreements with both adding and unbundling and fewer agreements that were just focused 
on price (and so below at least one party’s reservation point; Table 11).  
Discussion 
 Experiment 2 found that adopting both high and low construal levels fostered both adding 
and unbundling issues. In contrast, a negotiation between parties who each adopted a different 
construal level did not appear to confer benefits (or generate confusion). There were signs that 
the reason for the difference was that adopting both high and low construal levels individually 
encouraged parties to think about both broad aims and detailed information during planning and 
to discuss both kinds of information in their negotiations.  
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Adopting both construal levels individually did appear to be difficult. That this difficulty 
had a benefit is consistent with previous research that processing information with more effort 
leads to deeper and more elaborate evaluations of information and better decision making (De 
Dreu, Nijstad, & van Knippenberg, 2008; Fisk, Lin, & Neuberg, 1999) Importantly, the kind of 
difficulty introduced by adopting both high and low construal levels is that it compels parties to 
think in different ways about the same information. This is also consistent with research on 
paradoxical cognition and creativity (Miron-Spektor, Gino, & Argote, 2011) that suggests that 
considering both of two conflicting approaches fosters generating creative ideas. Adopting both 
of two construal levels might be a kind of desirable difficulty (Bjork & Bjork, 2011) that 
promotes understanding. As a result, considering both the broad aims and also the details of a 
negotiation could help negotiators to improve their outcomes.   
2.6. General discussion 
Negotiation scholars emphasize the importance of creativity for successful negotiation 
(e.g., Bazerman et al., 1985; Lax & Sebenius, 2006; Pruitt, 1983a; Thompson, 1998; Walton & 
McKersie, 1965). The current studies add to a growing body of work examining negotiations in 
which parties can redefine the issues under discussion and so form creative agreements 
(Anderson & Thompson, 2004; Kray et al., 2009; Loewenstein & Howell, 2010; e.g., Maddux et 
al., 2008; Sinaceur et al., 2013). The current work extends this work by noting that negotiators 
can generate creative solutions in different ways. Two of the most common ways are unbundling 
an existing issue (Fisher, 1964; Loewenstein & Howell, 2010) and adding new issues (Galinsky 
et al., 2008; Maddux et al., 2008). Negotiation research, theorizing, and prescriptions largely 
assume that one set of factors increases integrative outcomes, and that all integrative outcomes 
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are the result of the same factors. In contrast, this dissertation examined when and why 
negotiators generate different kinds of creative agreements.  
The two studies found initial evidence that construal levels fostered different types of 
creative agreements. The first experiment found that low-level construals led negotiators to focus 
on the details of the main issue and, in turn, to generate creative agreements that unbundled the 
existing issue. The second experiment found that adopting both high-level and low-level 
construals was able to encourage a more thorough analysis of the situation and lead to forming 
agreements that both added a new issue and unbundled the existing issue. Thus, these studies 
offer support for the possibility that different factors can lead to forming systematically different 
kinds of integrative agreements. 
These studies also offer new evidence and raise new questions about construal level 
theory. Consistent with prior research, low-level construals tended to lead parties to focus on 
details and high-level construals tended to lead parties to focus on broad concerns. Yet the first 
experiment raised the question of whether construal levels are best thought of as binary, low 
versus high, or graded, lower and higher. It is possible that taking a very high level construal on 
a negotiation could lead to focusing on whether or not to form an agreement, but not being 
concerned about the specifics. Rather than being flexible, a very high level construal might 
simply lead to simplification. This could produce simple concessions and simple agreements or 
failures to agree. Thus, as a caution to prior work emphasizing the benefits of a high-level 
construal for forming integrative agreements, it is worth considering a cautionary note that high-
level construals might also lead to less discerning analysis and so less value creation. 
The second experiment offered a second extension to construal level theory, which is the 
possibility of adopting both a high-level and a low-level construal on the same situation. If the 
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goal of negotiators is to thoroughly understand a negotiation situation, and if there are many and 
varied possibilities for creatively redefining the negotiation problem, then adopting multiple 
construal levels could be a useful general practice during planning. This is related to discussions 
of the role of perspective taking in negotiation. There, the emphasis has been on taking the 
perspective of one’s counterpart. Yet there may be value in taking a variety of perspectives, not 
just that of one’s counterpart, if the objective is to generate creative possibilities. So too might it 
make sense for negotiators to adopt the practice during planning of considering their situations 
using multiple construal levels.  
Both experiments also raised an important point about creativity and negotiation. The 
negotiation literature has long emphasized focusing on interests as a basis for flexibility and 
value creation. However, much of the literature has also emphasized that interests are higher-
level aims. This is echoed in the creativity literature, which tends to focus on broadening out, 
widening one’s search, and the like. Yet as the studies showed with respect to unbundling an 
existing issue in a negotiation, creativity can also involve diving into the specifics. The 
overarching concern, from Walton and McKersie (1965) is with redefining the negotiation 
problem. This can mean both broadening out to incorporate additional concerns and also 
reframing the existing concerns.  
 These studies also have notable limitations. One concern is that the process variables 
used to investigate the pathways between construal levels and creative agreements differed in the 
two experiments. Specifically, Experiment 1 focused on what negotiators were focused on when 
planning for their negotiations and not the statements made during the negotiations. Surprisingly, 
the results of Experiment 1 did not show a reliable correlation between the types of information 
that were a focus during planning and the types of information shared during the negotiation. 
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This might be due to the sample size and a lack of power. This might be due to parties talking 
about information relevant to adding and unbundling issues as part of their introductions as well 
as more substantively, and the difficulty in differentiating those events in the transcript coding 
effort. It may be that listening to mentioning is the critical point, but this is harder to establish 
from transcripts. So, future research could examine the relationship between parties’ focus 
during planning and the content and nature of their discussions. This is important as both studies 
found that nearly every dyad shared information that they could have used for forming creative 
agreements, but far fewer actually formed creative agreements. The ambiguity of information 
and the difference between sharing and appreciating information, perhaps informed by 
negotiators’ focus during planning, is thus an important question for negotiation research. 
 Another concern is the effectiveness of the high construal level manipulation. The 
method used in the studies asked participants to consider the “abstract reasons of the case.” 
However, this instruction did not lead to an increase in providing information linked to abstract 
aims and information linked to adding new issues. Perhaps this manipulation led participants to 
consider too high a level of construal. Thus, future research could consider alternative 
manipulations of construal, such as asking participants to consider “why are you negotiating?” 
Future research could also examine more than different levels of construal. These possibilities 
might shed light on what is helpful for considering useful big picture information and adding 
relevant issues to create value.  
There was also a question arising out of Experiment 2. In that study, there was a 
challenge over how to evaluate whether and to what extent parties were focused on and 
discussing information about both adding and unbundling issues. Experiment 2 used categorical 
variables to capture parties’ focus during planning (did parties discuss both kinds of information 
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or not), whereas Experiment 1 used a count variable to capture parties’ focus during planning 
(how many statements of a given type did parties make). It is not obvious how to generate a 
count variable to capture the focus on the information for both adding and unbundling. There is a 
question for future research regarding the appropriate conceptual and operational approach to 
capture negotiators focus and discussions.  
Lastly, the current research suggested a specific kind of link between levels of 
abstractness and types of creative agreements. It linked concrete details to unbundling an existing 
issue and abstract aims to adding new issues. An interesting possibility is that there might be 
cases in which these change. Perhaps considering broad aims could be helpful for unbundling an 
existing issue. Perhaps focusing on details could be helpful for adding new issues. For instance, 
the Sinai Peninsula negotiation between Egypt and Israel would not have unbundle the existing 
issue unless Egypt and Israel had considered their broad aims (sovereignty and peace, 
respectively). In addition, adding a warranty (a new issue) could be the result of focusing on the 
concrete details of the existing issues. That is, while adding might primarily be a matter of high 
level construal and unbundling might primarily be a matter of low level construal, perhaps it is 
possible that there are some cases in which it goes the other way around. Future research could 
examine when it why the relationships operate as they do. 
To conclude, two experiments were conducted in which negotiators could explore 
different types of creative options to meet their underlying interests. Experiment 1 found that 
different construal levels led to different approaches to creating value. Experiment 2 found that 
individuals who adopted both high-level and low-level construals about the same situation were 
more likely to maximize value creation relative to dyads who adopted different construal levels 
or indeed the aggregate of all the dyads we have investigated previously with such exercises. 
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Maximizing value creation is challenging, and adopting both high-level and low-level construals 
is therefore an intervention of considerable interest. In addition, adopting both kinds of 
construals could be beneficial not only in the domain of negotiation, but also more broadly in the 
workplace. For example, managers often have to communicate with different functional 
specialists, and adopting both high-level and low-level construals might foster effective 
communication and translation. 
This work speaks to three streams of research on negotiation. First, this dissertation is one 
of the rare studies that examines two distinct types of value creation within the same situation, 
and is the first study to propose specific factors that lead to specific kinds of value creating 
agreements. Second, this research provides new reasons to consider construal level and its effects 
on negotiation. Finally, even apart from negotiation, this work provides reasons to consider the 
adoption of both a high-level and a low-level construal for its role in creativity and decision 
making.  
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TABLE 2 
PLANNING INFORMATION M (SD) IN EXPERIMENT 1 
 
 
  
 
Low construal level condition 
(n = 29) 
High construal level condition 
(n = 28) 
Sig. 
Planning details 2.21 (1.82)  .89 (.96) .001** 
Planning unbundling item  .72 (.70)  .32 (.55) .02* 
Planning broad aims  .72 (.92)  .96 (.96) .34 
Planning adding item  .52 (.63)  .25 (.52) .09+ 
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TABLE 3 
NEGOTIATOR PERCEPTION M (SD) IN EXPERIMENT 1 
 
 
 
  
 
Low construal level condition 
(n = 58) 
High construal level condition 
(n = 56) 
Sig. 
Perceived difficulties    
    Describing two activities 3.42 (1.42) 3.68 (1.42) .35 
    Preparing for negotiation 3.04 (1.18) 3.37 (1.15) .16 
    Engaging in negotiation 3.39 (1.42) 3.74 (1.45) .23 
    
Extent of information processing 
    Considering all information 
 
3.99 (.74) 
 
3.92 (.71) 
 
.65 
    Thorough judgment 4.03 (.71) 3.89 (.51) .31 
    Thinking deeply 
 
3.74 (.87) 
 
3.55 (.86) 
 
.26 
 
Overall mood 7.42 (1.74) 7.89 (1.78) .29 
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TABLE 4 
TYPES OF DEAL IN EXPERIMENT 1 
 
 
  
 Low construal level condition 
(n = 29) 
High construal level condition 
(n = 28) 
Impasse 3 (10%) 2 (7%) 
Below reservation points 7 (24%) 12 (43%) 
Deal with unbundling 12 (42%) 7 (25%) 
Deal with adding 4 (14%) 5 (18%) 
Deal with both adding and unbundling  3 (10%) 2 (7%) 
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TABLE 5 
INFORMATION SHARING M (SD) IN EXPERIMENT 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Low construal level condition 
(n = 29) 
High construal level condition 
(n = 28) 
Sig. 
Discussing details 2.14 (1.19) 1.96 (1.20) .59 
Discussing unbundling item 2.76 (1.61) 2.64 (1.19) .76 
Discussing broad aims 2.21 (1.84) 1.36 (1.13) .04* 
Discussing adding item 1.79 (1.35) 1.93 (1.78) .75 
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TABLE 7 
PLANNING FOR DETAILS AND BROAD AIMS IN EXPERIMENT 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 Mixed construals  
between parties 
(n = 24) 
Mixed construals  
within each party 
(n = 24) 
Planning details   
    No parties considered 11 (46%) 6 (25%) 
    One party considered 9 (37%) 11 (46%) 
    Both parties considered 4 (17%) 7 (29%) 
   
Planning unbundling information   
    No parties considered 13 (54%) 15 (63%) 
    One party considered 10 (42%) 7 (29%) 
    Both parties considered 1 (4%) 2 (8%) 
   
Planning broad aims   
    No parties considered 5 (21%) 4 (17%) 
    One party considered 15 (62%) 12 (50%) 
    Both parties considered 4 (17%) 8 (33%) 
   
Planning adding information   
    No parties considered 12 (50%) 12 (50%) 
    One party considered 10 (42%) 12 (50%) 
    Both parties considered 2 (8%) 0 (0%) 
   
Planning both items    
    No parties considered 14 (58%) 10 (42%) 
    One party considered 9 (38%) 12 (50%) 
    Both parties considered 1 (4%) 2 (8%) 
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TABLE 8 
INFORMATION SHARING M (SD) IN EXPERIMENT 2 
 
 
  
 
Mixed construals 
between parties 
(n = 24) 
Mixed construals 
within each party 
(n = 24) 
Sig. 
Discussing details 1.76 (1.14) 2.33 (1.03) .25 
Discussing unbundling item 2.60 (1.81) 3.33 (1.21) .34 
Discussing broad aims 1.36 (1.21) 2.33 (1.51) .08+ 
Discussing adding item 1.69 (1.41) 4.17 (1.17) .00** 
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TABLE 9 
PLANNING ABOUT THE RANGE OF INFORMATION IN EXPERIMENT 2 
 
  
 Mixed construals  
between parties 
(n = 24) 
Mixed construals  
within each party 
(n = 24) 
Both kinds of information not included   
   No parties considered any items 1 (4%) 0 (0%) 
   
   One party considered one item or        
   both parties considered one item  
12 (50%) 6 (25%) 
   
Both kinds of information included   
   Each party considered one item each or  4 (17%) 7 (29%) 
   one party considered both items    
   
   One party considered both items while 
   the other party considered one item 
6 (25%) 9 (38%) 
   
   Both parties considered both items  1 (4%) 2 (8%) 
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TABLE 10 
NEGOTIATOR PERCEPTION M (SD) IN EXPERIMENT 2 
 
 
  
 
Mixed construal level  
between parties 
(n = 48) 
Mixed construal level  
within each party 
(n = 48) 
Sig. 
Perceived difficulties    
    Describing four activities 2.79 (1.56) 3.46 (1.58)   .04* 
    Preparing for negotiation 3.04 (1.13) 3.56 (1.49) .05 
    Engaging in negotiation 3.54 (1.28) 3.71 (1.32) .53 
    
Extent of information processing 
    Considering all information 
 
3.77 (.75) 
 
4.00 (.83) 
 
.16 
    Thorough judgment 3.75 (.67) 3.88 (.73) .39 
    Thinking deeply 
 
3.52 (.83) 
 
3.85 (.80) 
 
  .05* 
 
Overall mood 7.52 (1.62) 7.75 (1.70) .50 
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TABLE 11 
TYPES OF DEAL IN EXPERIMENT 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mixed construal level  
between parties 
(n = 24) 
Mixed construal level 
within each party 
(n = 24) 
Impasse 1 (4%) 1 (4%) 
Below reservation points 10 (42%) 6 (25%) 
Deal with unbundling 9 (37%) 7 (29%) 
Deal with adding 4 (17%) 4 (17%) 
Deal with both adding and unbundling 0 (0%) 6 (25%) 
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APPENDIX A 
NEGOTIATION ROLE MATERIALS: TENANT ROLE MATERIALS 
The Peabody Terrace Negotiation 
 
Role of: Jordan Rodriguez 
 
It is April, and your most urgent task is to sublet your apartment. That’s what you’ll be trying to 
do in just a few minutes when you talk to someone else who is looking to rent an apartment. 
Hopefully yours! 
 
It’s a nice apartment. It’s probably too nice an apartment! Your bank account is empty. 
Realistically, your best move is to rent out your nice apartment, hop in your car and drive back 
home for the summer. That way you can actually afford to buy the Business Process 
Management ($160 ouch!) and Logistics Management ($200 yikes!) textbooks for the online 
classes you need to take this summer and eat something other than ramen.  
 
The apartment is a furnished studio that is a 5-minute walk to the business school. According to 
your lease, you are responsible for a rental fee of $880 per month for June and July. When you 
were getting your mail in the lobby of your apartment building, you saw the following four posts 
on the building’s bulletin board:  
 
Room for sublease 
Furnished studio $855/month 
dan33@gmail.com 
Parking wanted 
Summer parking less than 90/month 
28hy@gmail.com 
Sublease APT 
Cozy studio, $750/month 
stst2@gmail.com 
Looking for summer housing 
Less than $600/month  
opq2q@gmail.com 
 
This, along with some looking online, led you to post a note for your “furnished studio 
apartment, $780 per month” that comes with high speed internet and a parking space but no 
utilities included, on the building’s bulletin board as well as on social media. Two days later, you 
got a note from someone interested in your apartment. You are very motivated to make a deal! 
Today you are meeting the potential subtenant, Terry Dumlao. If you can get at least $700 per 
month, you will take it. If not, well, you have no idea whether you will get any other offers, so 
you better do everything you can to try to make this work!  
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APPENDIX B 
 
NEGOTIATION ROLE MATERIALS: POTENTIAL SUBTENANT ROLE MATERIALS 
The Peabody Terrace Negotiation 
Role of: Terry Dumlao 
 
It is April, and your most urgent task is to find an apartment to rent for the summer. That’s what 
you’ll be trying to do in just a few minutes when you talk to someone else who has an apartment 
for rent. Hopefully to you! 
 
You need to rent an apartment for June and July because you have to stay on campus for the 
summer to take two finance classes for your major. If only they were offered online! And if only 
the textbooks weren’t so expensive! Corporate Financial Management ($137) and Global 
Financial Markets ($225) are pricey. Oh well. It will help to sell your Business Process 
Management ($160) and Logistics Management ($200) textbooks from this semester yourself, 
because the bookstore only gives half price and you need the money more than they do.  
 
So, all of this is to say that you have a limited budget and you want to find a cheaper place to live 
than the dorms. Since you do not have a car, you are looking for a place close to the business 
school. You visited a friend who lives in a furnished apartment at Peabody Terrace, and you 
liked it. It is a 5-minute walk to the business school. On your way out, in the lobby of the 
apartment, you saw the following four posts on the building’s bulletin board: 
 
Room for sublease 
Furnished studio $855/month 
dan33@gmail.com 
Parking wanted 
Summer parking less than 90/month 
28hy@gmail.com 
Sublease APT 
Cozy studio, $750/month 
stst2@gmail.com 
Looking for summer housing 
Less than $600/month  
opq2q@gmail.com 
 
You checked, but the two apartment listings on the bulletin board are no longer available. But 
you found a note for another furnished studio Peabody Terrace apartment for $780 per month. 
Great! Still, you set your target as $570 per month. Most students are away over the summer, so 
you think the prices people list are really high and the actual price you will need to pay will be 
much lower. You contacted the person subleasing the apartment, Jordan Rodriguez, and set up a 
time to meet. You are very motivated to make a deal, as it would save you time and money. If 
you can get the apartment for less than $650 per month, you will take it. If not, well, you have no 
idea whether you will find any other apartments you want, so you better do everything you can to 
try to make this work! 
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APPENDIX C 
CONSTRUAL LEVEL MANIPULATION INSTRUCTIONS:  
LOW CONSTRUAL LEVEL MANIPULATION INSTRUCTIONS 
You are about to participate in a negotiation exercise. Negotiation research shows that thinking 
about the current negotiation case in a concrete way can be useful. To help you think concretely 
about your negotiation, please start by thinking concretely about the following everyday 
activities.      
 
1. Please describe what concrete details are involved when people back up a computer. 
 
 
 
2. Please describe what concrete details are involved when people drive a car. 
 
 
 
Now please think about your negotiation case in a concrete way. As taking your role in the case, 
please describe what concrete details are involved in your negotiation. 
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APPENDIX D 
CONSTRUAL LEVEL MANIPULATION INSTRUCTIONS:  
HIGH CONSTRUAL LEVEL MANIPULATION INSTRUCTIONS 
You are about to participate in a negotiation exercise. Negotiation research shows that thinking 
about the current negotiation case in an abstract way can be useful. To help you think abstractly 
about your negotiation, please start by thinking abstractly about the following everyday 
activities.      
1. Please describe what abstract reasons are involved when people back up a computer. 
 
 
 
2. Please describe what abstract reasons are involved when people drive a car. 
 
 
 
Now please think about your negotiation case in an abstract way. As taking your role in the case, 
please describe what abstract reasons are involved in your negotiation. 
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APPENDIX E 
POST-NEGOTIATION QUESTIONNAIRES IN EXPERIMENT 1 
How difficult to provide descriptions for the two activities (i.e., backing up a computer and 
driving a car)? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all difficult    Very difficult 
 
How difficult to prepare for your negotiation? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all difficult    Very difficult 
 
How difficult to engage in your negotiation? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all difficult    Very difficult 
 
During the task, how much did you try to take into considerations all possible information? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Rarely    Very much 
 
During the task, how much did you to make judgments and decisions as thorough as possible? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Rarely    Very much 
 
During the task, how much did you think deeply? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Seldom    All the time 
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Overall, my mood is  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Very unpleasant       Very pleasant 
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APPENDIX F 
MIXED CONSTRUAL LEVEL MANIPULATION INSTRUCTIONS: 
MIXED CONSTRUAL LEVELS WITHIN EACH PARTY INSTRUCTIONS 
You are about to participate in a negotiation exercise. Negotiation research shows that thinking 
about the current negotiation case both in an abstract way and in a concrete way can help you 
better understand it. To help you think abstractly about your negotiation, please start by thinking 
abstractly about the following everyday activities.      
  
1. Please describe what abstract reasons are involved when people drive a car. 
 
 
2. Please describe what abstract reasons are involved when people get dressed in the morning. 
 
 
Now please go back to your negotiation role materials. In your role, please think about the case 
in an abstract way. Based on your role materials, please describe what abstract reasons are 
involved in your negotiation. 
 
 
Now you can think about the current negotiation case in a concrete way. What does it mean to 
think concretely? Here are two simple questions to help you get started.  
1. Please describe what concrete details are involved when people drive a car. 
 
 
2. Please describe what concrete details are involved when people get dressed in the morning. 
 
Now please go back to your negotiation role materials. In your role, please think about the case 
in a concrete way. Based on your role materials, please describe what concrete details are 
involved in your negotiation. 
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APPENDIX G 
MIXED CONSTRUAL LEVEL MANIPULATION INSTRUCTIONS: 
MIXED CONSTRUAL LEVELS BETWEEN PARTIES INSTRUCTIONS 
FOR HIGH CONSTRUAL LEVEL MANIPULATION INSTRUCTIONS 
You are about to participate in a negotiation exercise. Negotiation research shows that thinking 
about the current negotiation case in an abstract way can be useful. To help you think abstractly 
about your negotiation, please start by thinking abstractly about the following everyday 
activities.      
1. Please describe what abstract reasons are involved when people back up a computer. 
 
 
 
2. Please describe what abstract reasons are involved when people drive a car. 
 
 
 
3. Please describe what abstract reasons are involved when people get dressed in the morning. 
 
 
 
4. Please describe what abstract reasons are involved when people organize a meeting. 
 
 
 
Now please think about your negotiation case in an abstract way. As taking your role in the case, 
please describe what abstract reasons are involved in your negotiation. 
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APPENDIX H 
MIXED CONSTRUAL LEVEL MANIPULATION INSTRUCTIONS: 
MIXED CONSTRUAL LEVELS BETWEEN PARTIES INSTRUCTIONS 
FOR LOW CONSTRUAL LEVEL MANIPULATION INSTRUCTIONS 
You are about to participate in a negotiation exercise. Negotiation research shows that thinking 
about the current negotiation case in a concrete way can be useful. To help you think concretely 
about your negotiation, please start by thinking concretely about the following everyday 
activities.      
1. Please describe what concrete details are involved when people back up a computer. 
 
 
 
2. Please describe what concrete details are involved when people drive a car. 
 
 
 
3. Please describe what concrete details are involved when people get dressed in the morning. 
 
 
 
4. Please describe what concrete details are involved when people organize a meeting. 
 
 
 
Now please think about your negotiation case in a concrete way. As taking your role in the case, 
please describe what concrete details are involved in your negotiation. 
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APPENDIX I 
POST-NEGOTIATION QUESTIONNAIRES IN EXPERIMENT 2 
How difficult to provide descriptions for the four activities (e.g., backing up a computer and 
driving a car)? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all difficult    Very difficult 
 
How difficult to prepare for your negotiation? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all difficult    Very difficult 
 
How difficult to engage in your negotiation? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all difficult    Very difficult 
 
During the task, how much did you try to take into considerations all possible information? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Rarely    Very much 
 
During the task, how much did you to make judgments and decisions as thorough as possible? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Rarely    Very much 
 
During the task, how much did you think deeply? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Seldom    All the time 
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Overall, my mood is  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Very unpleasant       Very pleasant 
 
